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Getting a Grip on Payne And Restricting
the Influence of Victim Impact Statements
in Capital Sentencing: The Timothy
McVeigh Case and Various State
Approaches Compared
by NIRU SHANI=R*
I. Introduction
In 1987' and 19892 the Supreme Court pronounced that the ad-
mission of victim impact statements at the sentencing stage of a crimi-
nal proceeding was cruel and unusual punishment. Then in 1991, the
Supreme Court reversed course and upheld the admission of victim
impact statements at capital sentencing in Payne v. Tennessee.' Since
that time, federal and state jurisdictions throughout the country have
permitted the introduction of victim impact testimony which allows
family, friends, and members of the community to testify at the de-
fendant's capital sentence hearing about the impact the crime had
upon them personally. This testimony includes anything from the im-
pact upon individual family members to the overall impact of the vic-
tim's death on the community. In capital cases the jury considers the
testimony in determining whether to sentence the defendant to life in
prison or death.
Though long allowed in civil trials and in non-capital cases, the
use of victim impact testimony in capital sentencing poses a particular
problem in capital punishment jurisprudence, for the effect of such
testimony does not bear on damages or length of prison term, but in-
stead, frequently determines life or death. Thus, the personalized na-
ture of victim impact testimony, and the emotions that are at the crux
* B.A. 1992, University of Michigan; M.A. 1994, College of William & Mary; J.D.
1998, Emory University Law School. The author wishes to thank Professor John Witte, Jr.,
Emory University Law School, for his assistance in the writing of this article.
1. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
2. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
3. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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of such testimony, introduces what borders on an impermissible ele-
ment of arbitrariness in capital sentencing. Despite the threat of ca-
price this evidence interjects in capital cases, the Supreme Court has
not provided any clear guidance for the admission of victim impact
testimony.
Many attribute the acceptance of victim impact testimony in capi-
tal sentencing to the Victims' Rights Movement, which started in the
1960s and has steadily gained momentum at the state and local level
during the past four decades. What began as a women's rights move-
ment toward fairer treatment of rape victims has evolved into a seri-
ous attempt to accommodate the needs and interests of crime victims
without infringing upon the rights of defendants. Many states have
responded to this important movement by enacting statutes that re-
quire, among other things, that victims be notified of the time and
place of criminal proceedings, and that they receive restitution.
In addition to state legislation, the federal response to the vic-
tims' rights movement has been overwhelming.4 In 1982, Congress
enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act.5 This Act preceded
the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19846 and
the Crime Control Act of 1990. Now, as a result of strong support at
all levels, victims are less likely to fall prey to institutional insensitivity
by the system that is intended to help them.'
The most dramatic example of the sweeping force of the victims'
rights movement can be seen in the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the
Oklahoma City bombing. Victims injured in the bombing of the
Oklahoma City federal building and survivors of victims who died in
the April 1995 explosion became angered when the judge who pre-
sided over the case barred those victims and family members planning
to give victim impact testimony from sitting in the courtroom during
4. See generally Carrie L. Mulholland, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of
Victim Impact Statements, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731,734-35 (1995); Ashley Paige Dugger, Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A History of Incompatibility, 23 Am. J. CRiM. L.
375, 377-80 (1996).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1982). An amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure requiring the inclusion of victim impact statements as part of a presentence report
submitted to the sentencing authority.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1984).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1990).
8. See generally Michael Chertoff, Victims Attain a Voice in the Criminal Justice Pro-
cess, 159 N.J. LAw., Feb.-March 1994, at 49; Katie Long, Community Input at Sentencing:
Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge, 75 B.U. L. REv. 187, 190 (1995) ("Since its rebirth in
the middle of this century, the concept of 'victims' rights' has garnered support and
momentum.").
the trial.9 Victims' rights advocates appealed, arguing that they were
forced to choose between attending the trial and testifying at sentenc-
ing. A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit upheld the judge's rul-
ing, and the full circuit eventually affirmed.1 ° Following the ruling, the
victims' advocates took their campaign to Capitol Hill, where they
were not disappointed. In response to lobbying efforts, Congress
passed a bill that effectively overturned the judge's ruling.1
In spite of its important place in criminal jurisprudence, the vic-
tims' rights movement of the past forty years has been wrongly char-
acterized as the driving force behind the statutorily sanctioned
admission of victim impact statements at capital sentencing. Instead,
this type of evidence is better justified as rightly equating the severity
of a criminal's punishment with the totality of harm caused. Victim
impact statements should not be admissible in capital sentencing as a
means of vindicating victims' rights, or elevating a victim's sense of
dignity through involvement with the criminal process. Nor should
victim impact statements be justified in the name of fairness to the
victim. State and federal legislation have already tended to these le-
gitimate concerns.
Victim impact evidence serves a proper role only when it is used
to apprise the jury of the total harm resulting from the criminal act.
Guidelines are necessary to ensure the evidence is used for this pur-
pose only. "Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained until it is narrowed
to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."'" The Payne stan-
dard, which allows unfettered admission of victim impact statements,
will not achieve the narrow goal of equating punishment with harm.
Left unrestricted, Payne opens the courtroom door to a flood of preju-
dice, unconstitutional bias,'3 and death sentencing based on the ability
9. Federal evidence rules allow judges to exclude material witnesses from trial pro-
ceedings to prevent them from changing their testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 615. The judge was
concerned that what the witnesses heard and saw in the courtroom could prejudice their
victim impact testimony.
10. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997).
11. 18 U.S.C. §3510 (1997). President Clinton signed the Victim Rights Clarification
Act of 1997 into law on March 20, 1997. The statute states that a United States District
Court shall not order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial of a defendant ac-
cused of that offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to
the effect of the offense on the victim and the victim's family.
12. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (Rehnquist, J.)(citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
122 (1934)).
13. See generally Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case
for Pre-Trial Disclosure, and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital
Jury Sentencing, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 367,402 (1997) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Payne
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of the victim's family to articulate a gut wrenching story of loss and
sadness. The only way to achieve the justice envisioned in Payne is by
placing parameters on the admission of victim impact testimony,
thereby restricting its influence.
This paper will assess the history of victim impact testimony, and
the problems associated with Payne's overly broad admission standard
as highlighted by Timothy McVeigh's trial following the Oklahoma
City bombing. Analysis will be made of the several attempts by states
to implement and tailor the Payne decision. Then methods will be
proposed for restricting the prejudicial effect of victim impact state-
ments. Part II of this comment provides a history of victim impact
testimony in capital sentencing. Part III illustrates how several of the
states are tailoring the Payne decision through statutory law. Part IV
assesses the parameters of victim impact testimony after Payne by
looking at last year's sentencing of Timothy McVeigh in the
Oklahoma City bombing case. Part V puts forth leading criticisms of
the admission of victim impact testimony. Part VI concludes that
there is a place in capital jurisprudence for victim impact testimony,
and proposes appropriate parameters for the admissibility of this
evidence.
H. The History of Victim Impact Statements in
Capital Sentencing
The Supreme Court first considered the admissibility of victim
impact statements at capital sentencing in Booth v. Maryland, holding
that the introduction of such evidence at the sentencing phase of a
capital case violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 4 Jus-
tice Powell, writing for the majority, reiterated the well-settled rule
that a jury's discretion to impose the death sentence must be "suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."' 5 Powell further noted that the sentencing jury is
required to focus on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human
being."' 6 He concluded that victim impact testimony is unconstitu-
tional because it focuses the attention of the jury on the character and
reputation of the victim rather than the defendant, which creates the
potential for a jury to impose a death sentence based on factors un-
has opened the door to victim impact participation in capital jury sentencing and has not
placed many tangible limits on that participation.").
14. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
15. Id. at 502 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1987)).
16. Id. at 504 (citing Woodsen v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
known to the defendant at the time of the crime and irrelevant to the
defendant's decision to commit the crime.'"
Justice Powell identified several factors that creates "an imper-
missible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an
arbitrary manner."' 8 First, imposition of a death sentence could be
swayed by the articulateness of a victim's family, or whether the vic-
tim left behind a family at all.19 Second, capital sentencing could
"turn on the perception that the victim was a sterling member of the
community rather than someone of questionable character."2 Third,
it would be impossible to provide a fair opportunity for the defendant
to rebut victim impact evidence without turning the sentencing hear-
ing into a mini-trial of the victim's character.2' Finally, the victim's
opinions and characterizations of the crime serve "no other purpose
than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the
relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant."'22 Driven
by these considerations, Justice Powell found that the admission of
victim impact testimony is inconsistent with the reasoned decision
making required in capital cases and mandated by the Eighth
Amendment.'
The Supreme Court extended Booth two years later in South Car-
olina v. Gathers.24 In Gathers, the Court held that the inadmissibility
of victim impact statements includes a prohibition against a prosecu-
tor's discussing matters related to the victim's character that are irrel-
evant to the circumstances of the crime.' The Court equated
evidence which attested to the victim's character in Gathers with vic-
tim impact evidence in Booth: both diverted the sentencing jury's at-
tention away from the defendant, and toward the victim.26 The Court
reaffirmed its prior holding that, in deciding whether to impose the
death penalty, a jury must deliver a sentence proportionate to the de-
fendant's personal responsibility, moral guilt and blameworthiness.27
Four years after Booth, the Supreme Court, in Payne v. Tennes-
see, reversed itself and held that victim impact testimony at the sen-
17. See id. at 504-05.
18. Id. at 505.
19. See id. at 504-05.
20. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. at 506.
21. See id. at 506-07.
22. Id. at 508.
23. See id. at 508-09.
24. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
25. See id. at 811-12.
26. See id
27. See id. at 810.
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tencing phase of a capital case is constitutional.28 Chief Justice
Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in Payne, stating decisively
that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to the admission of
victim impact evidence.29
The Payne Court began its analysis by examining the underlying
premises of the Booth decision: that evidence relating to the harm a
capital defendant causes a victim's family does not generally reflect on
the defendant's blameworthiness; and that only evidence relating to
blameworthiness is relevant to capital sentencing decisions.3° How-
ever, the Court noted that the assessment of harm caused by the de-
fendant as a result of the crime charged has long been an important
concern of criminal law, in determining both the elements of the of-
fense and the appropriate punishment. Victim impact evidence, it ac-
knowledged, "is simply another form or method of informing the
sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in
question. '31 The Court explained that inequity would result if abso-
lutely unfettered introduction of mitigating evidence were allowed
and victim impact evidence was completely barred.32 According to
the Court, victim impact statements are designed to show an individ-
ual victim's uniqueness as a human being, and not the comparative
worth or worthlessness of the victim's life.33 Thus, victim impact evi-
dence is merely another means of informing the sentencing jury about
the specific harm caused by the crime in question, and not a method
of injecting arbitrariness into capital sentencing as described in
Booth.34 Interestingly, the Payne court limited its analysis to evidence
relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the vic-
tim's family. Booth had also held that the admission of a victim's fam-
ily members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the
defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. The Payne court left this part of Booth undisturbed.
Payne noted that if, in a particular case, victim impact evidence so
unduly prejudices the jury that it renders the trial fundamentally un-
fair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would
provide a mechanism for relief.35 The Court, however, concluded that
28. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
29. See id. at 824, 827.
30. See id. at 819.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 825-26.
33. See id. at 823-24.
34. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
35. See id.
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in order for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral cul-
pability and blameworthiness, "it should have before it at the sentenc-
ing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant."36
Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Souter each concurred separately
in Payne. Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's holding that
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar against victim impact evi-
dence, and a state may legitimately determine victim impact evidence
is relevant to a capital sentencing proceeding. 7 It is within a state's
discretion, according to Justice O'Connor, to decide whether the jury
should know the full extent of the harm caused by the crime, including
its impact on the victim's family and community. 8 She also noted that
it was similarly within a state's discretion to decide whether the jury
should be given a glimpse of the person whose life was taken.3 9 "Cer-
tainly there is no strong societal consensus that a jury may not take
into account the loss suffered by a victim's family or that a murder
victim must remain a faceless stranger at the penalty phase of a capital
trial[,]" rather "[j]ust the opposite is true."4
Justice O'Connor stated that testimony by the victim's grand-
mother could not have inflamed the passion of the jury any more than
the facts of the crime itself.4 ' Murder, she concluded, "transforms a
living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby tak-
ing away all that is special and unique about the person. The Consti-
tution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that
back."42 Significantly, however, O'Connor noted that the Payne deci-
sion did not reach a specific kind of victim impact evidence-opinions
of the victim's family about the crime, the defendant, and the appro-
priate sentence-that had been addressed in Booth.4 3 Rather Payne
decided only that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state
from choosing to admit evidence concerning a murder victim's per-
36. Id. at 825. See generally Victor D. Vital, Payne v. Tennessee: The Use of Victim
Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing Trials, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 497 (1994) (for a
comprehensive analysis of the Payne decision).
37. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by White, J., and
Kennedy, J.).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 832.
42. Id.
43. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 833. In other words, Payne does not expressly overrule the
part of Booth that prohibits victim impact witnesses from expressing their opinion about
what punishment the defendant should receive.
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sonal characteristics or the impact of the crime on the victim's family
and community.
Justice Scalia applauded the Court for correctly observing the in-
justice of requiring the exclusion of relevant aggravating evidence dur-
ing capital sentencing while requiring the admission of all relevant
mitigating evidence.'W This imbalance, he stated, was "unworkable."45
Scalia noted that while the Eighth Amendment permits parity be-
tween mitigating and aggravating factors, more fundamentally still, it
permits the "People" to decide what is a crime and what constitutes
aggravation and mitigation of a crime by placing all of the evidence in
front of a jury.46
Justice Souter noted that the Court addressed two categories of
facts previously excluded from consideration at capital sentencing
proceedings by Booth: information revealing the individuality of the
victim, and the impact of the crime on the victim's family, friends and
community.47 Souter recognized, as did Justice O'Connor, that Payne
did not challenge the Court's holding in Booth that a sentencing au-
thority should not receive a third category of testimony concerning a
victim's family members' characterizations of and opinions about the
crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.48
Justice Souter rejected Booth's blanket prohibition of evidence
concerning the victim's individuality that may be unrelated to the cir-
cumstances of the crime. He stressed that traditionally, criminal con-
duct has been categorized and penalized differently according to
consequences not specifically intended, but determined in part by con-
ditions unknown to a defendant when he acted.49 The prohibition of
victim impact evidence, he stated, rests on the belief that such details
about the victim may have been outside the defendant's knowledge at
the time of the crime. But Justice Souter asserted that every defend-
ant, with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, knows
that the life he will take is that of a unique individual, and that the
person to be killed will probably leave survivors who will suffer from
the victim's death.5" Thus, although a defendant may not know the
details of a victim's life and characteristics, or the exact identities and
44. See id at 833 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined in part by O'Connor, J., and Kennedy,
J.)
45. Id
46. Id.
47. See id. at 835 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.)
48. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 835 n.1.
49. See id. at 835-36.
50. See id. at 836-37.
needs of those who may survive, the moral relevance of foreseeable
consequences should not be ignored."' "Harm to some group of survi-
vors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable as to
be virtually inevitable."5"
In summary, the Payne decision marked a significant turn in capi-
tal jurisprudence by reversing Booth's per se bar against victim impact
evidence relating to the victim, and the impact of the victim's death on
the victim's family at capital sentencing. As noted, part of Booth is
left untouched by the Payne decision: the Eighth Amendment contin-
ues to prevent a victim's family from making characterizations of the
crime or offering opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence. The Booth court stated that "the formal pres-
entation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose
than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the
relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant."53 The ad-
mission of such emotionally charged opinions, the Court reasoned, is
inconsistent with the reasoned decision making required in capital
cases. By not overturning this portion of Booth, the Payne court rec-
ognized the damaging potential of unrestricted victim impact testi-
mony. Nonetheless, the Court failed to articulate standards which
would keep the evidence it did admit from causing similar problems.
IL. How Are the States Restricting Payne?
Of the thirty-eight states that currently utilize the death penalty,54
most have incorporated victim impact statements into their capital
sentencing proceedings. The statutory guidelines for the admission of
victim impact testimony in capital proceedings in these states range
from very broad to extremely narrow. 5 Discussed below are several
examples of how these states have regulated the admission of victim
impact testimony after Payne.
A case from the New York courts illustrates why many states
have undertaken to restrict the inclusion of victim impact evidence.
In New York, where the death penalty was reinstated in 1995, the rele-
vant sentencing provision makes no mention of victim impact testi-
51. See id. at 837-38.
52. Il. at 838.
53. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
54. The jurisdictions that do not allow the death penalty are Alaska, the District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
55. See Brian J. Johnson, The Response to Payne v. Tennessee: Giving the Victim's
Family a Voice in the Capital Sentencing Process, 30 IND. L. REv. 795, 803-07 (1997).
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mony.5 6 It is presumably allowable, however, under preexisting New
York law, which states: "If the defendant is being sentenced for a fel-
ony[,] the court, if requested at least ten days prior to the sentencing
date, shall accord the victim the right to make a statement with regard
to any matter relevant to the question of sentence."57 Aside from the
language of Payne, New York has no guidelines governing the admis-
sion of victim impact statements. 8 This lack of guidance resulted in
unbridled admission of victim impact testimony in the well-known
case of Colin Ferguson, the gunman who opened fire on a Long Island
commuter train in 1993.19 The victims' families, and those victims
who survived were allowed to testify in open court during the sentenc-
ing stage of the proceedings. Some testified that the defendant was
evil, others threatened the defendant's life, and several called for his
death.6" Had the crime not occurred prior to the reinstatement of the
death penalty, Ferguson could have been sentenced to death, thanks,
in part, to the unguided, unbridled, and unrestricted admission of vic-
tim impact statements in New York.
New Jersey is one of twelve states that has revised its death pen-
alty statute since Payne to provide for measured consideration of vic-
tim impact evidence during capital sentencing. 61 In New Jersey, the
admission of victim impact statements in capital cases is statutorily
proscribed, unless the defendant first presents evidence of his or her
character.62 According to New Jersey's death penalty statute:
56. N.Y. CriM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
57. Id. § 380.50(2)(b) (McKinney 1994). The statute states that for the purposes of
this section, "victim" shall include, if the actual victim of the crime is deceased, a member
of the family of such victim, or the legal guardian or representative of the legal guardian of
the victim where such guardian or representative has personal knowledge of and a rela-
tionship with the victim, unless the court finds that it would be inappropriate for such
person to make a statement on behalf of the victim. See id. § 380.50(2)(a). See generally
William Hauptman, Lethal Reflection: New York's Death Penalty and Victim Impact State-
ments, 13 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs. 439, 474 (1997) (discussing the evolution of New
York's victim impact evidence provision).
58. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 380.50(2)(b) (McKinney 1994).
59. See Hauptman, supra note 57, at 440-41.
60. See id. at 441.
61. Those statutes are: ARK. CODE ANm. § 5-4-602 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1999);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030
(West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-302 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150
(Supp. 1996); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. § 23A-27A-2 (Michie Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Lexis Supp. 1996).
62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(6) (West 1995).
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When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence
of defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h)
of paragraph (5) of this subsection,63 the State may present evi-
dence of the murder victim's character and background and of
the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury
finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a
mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5)
of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor
evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in
determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence
presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this
subsection. 64
The defendant must open the door to his or her character before
the state can introduce victim impact evidence. This approach is en-
tirely consistent with Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Payne be-
cause the victim impact evidence in that case was used to rebut
evidence offered in mitigation.65
By only admitting victim impact testimony when a defendant puts
on mitigating evidence, the New Jersey statute gives the defendant an
opportunity to avoid inflammatory victim impact evidence altogether
by not presenting evidence of his own good character. Of course,
practically speaking, it would be rare for a defendant facing capital
sentencing to remain mute and not put on any mitigating evidence.
The statute also gives the state the opportunity to rebut mitigating
evidence, which by its very nature is difficult to cross-examine.
Presenting victim impact evidence in this light thus balances the scales
of justice during sentencing, giving both sides the opportunity to pres-
ent relevant character evidence.
While there is no constitutional requirement to level the playing
field between the defendant and the State, there seems little unfair in
allowing the State to present evidence counterbalancing that of the
defendant. "In capital sentencing, we see certain defendants spared a
death sentence based upon what the jury perceives as mitigators.
However, these mitigators themselves often have no connection to the
actual crime in question and instead include evidence such as the de-
63. Subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) reads: (5) The mitigating factors which may be
found by the jury or the court are (h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's
character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
3(5)(h).
64. Id. § 2C:11-3(6).
65. Payne, 501 U.S. at 838 ("given a defendant's option to introduce relevant evidence
in mitigation, sentencing without such evidence of victim impact may be seen as a signifi-
cantly imbalanced process") (citations omitted).
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fendant's behavior while in jail and previous contributions to soci-
ety."6 6 None of this type of evidence relates to the defendant's
culpability for the crime at issue. It follows that victim impact evi-
dence-which may relate to facts outside the knowledge of the de-
fendant, which are therefore irrelevant to his culpability-is no more
prejudicial to the defense than mitigating evidence is to the
prosecution.
After an attack on New Jersey's admission of victim impact evi-
dence proved unsuccessful, the state supreme court voluntarily im-
posed restrictions on the type of statements that could be made.67 In
State v. Muhammad, the court held that only one relative could speak
to the jury and that all remarks must first be approved by the presid-
ing judge.68 Muhammad established other guidelines governing the
introduction of victim impact statements in New Jersey. For example,
the "State will not be permitted to elicit testimony concerning the vic-
tim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the de-
fendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. Similarly, statements
that are grossly inflammatory, unduly prejudicial, or extremely likely
to divert the jury from its focus on the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors should be excluded."69 The court also noted that jury instructions
should explain that victim impact evidence may only be used to deter-
mine how much weight should be accorded to the catch all mitigating
factor, and not to support aggravating factors or justify a death sen-
tence.7" New Jersey's imposed restrictions on victim impact state-
ments properly respond to the overbroad admissibility standards of
Payne.
Of the other eleven states that have revised their death penalty
statutes since Payne to allow victim impact evidence during capital
sentencing, few have been as articulate as New Jersey in promulgating
parameters for its admission. For example, in Missouri the relevant
66. Dugger, supra note 4, at 403.
67. See State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996). See generally Aaron H.
Galileo, Article I, Paragraph 22-Victim's Rights Amendment-Victim Impact Evidence
Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment and is Permissible in a Capital Murder Case in
New Jersey- New Jersey v. Muhammad, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 723 (1997) (discuss-
ing New Jersey's leadership in the "nation-wide movement" towards greater victim partici-
pation through victim impact evidence).
68. Muhammad, 678 A.2d at 180.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 179. Although limiting instructions cannot eliminate the possibility that ju-
rors will misuse victim impact evidence, that concern "does not justify a prophylactic, con-
stitutionally based rule that this evidence may never be admitted." Id. (citing Payne, 501
U.S. at 831) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
state statute merely defines victim impact statements as "evidence
concerning the murder victim and the impact of the crime upon the
family of the victim and others,"'" without providing guidance as to its
admissibility. The Missouri statute's lack of guidance is illustrated by
the broad spectrum of victim impact evidence that has been admitted
under its auspices.
In several instances the Missouri Supreme Court admitted testi-
mony that should have been rejected even under the lenient Payne
jurisprudence. In State v. Wise, the first Missouri case to address the
issue of victim impact evidence following Payne, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that because the prosecutor's references to victim
impact were "brief, light and general," they were not grounds for re-
versal.72 The family members who testified did not describe their
"loss or emotional distress."'73 The Wise court found that the state-
ments did not "remove reason from the sentencing process, nor did
they inject caprice and emotion," therefore the defendant was not
prejudiced in a way which would render the trial fundamentally
unfair.74
In State v. Basile, the mother and sister of a murder victim testi-
fied as to the effect of the victim's death on the family, commented on
the victim's character and the nature of the crime, and prayed in the
courtroom for justice to be served.75 In State v. Simmons, the murder
victim's family members articulated characterizations of and opinions
about the crime.7 6 A strong argument can be made that praying for
justice to be served is the equivalent of calling for the death penalty,
which was clearly prohibited in Booth and never overturned in
Payne.77 Until Missouri enacts a statute that provides serious gui-
dance for the admission of victim impact statements the limits of
Payne will be stretched.
Georgia's admission of victim impact statements is also statuto-
rily prescribed.78 Georgia law permits "evidence from the family of
the victim, or such other witness having personal knowledge of the
victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime
71. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030(4) (West 1999).
72. 879 S.W.2d 494, 516 (Mo. 1994).
73. Id.
74. Id (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825).
75. 942 S.W.2d 343, 358-60 (Mo. 1997) (en bane).
76. 944 S.W.2d 165, 185-87 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
77. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2.
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1, 1.2 (West, WESTLAW through 1998 Reg. Sess.).
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on the victim, the victim's family, or the community. ' 79 Having recog-
nized that under some circumstances victim impact evidence has the
potential to render a death penalty sentence constitutionally infirm,
the Georgia legislature employed safeguards within the statute to en-
sure that only constitutionally relevant factors be admitted. 0 The
Georgia courts may exercise discretion to bar victim impact evidence
or to order that statements be made in a manner and to a degree that
does not inflame or unduly prejudice the jury. This language alone
did not reel in the potentially unfair inclusiveness of the statute, and
more restrictive guidelines were needed. The content pertaining to
"impact on the community" seems similar to placing a value on the
victim's life and leaves the door to sentencing based on social status
wide open. The criterion for who can testify also seems unnecessarily
broad, and susceptible to bias based on social status.81
In response to the broad language of Georgia's victim impact
statute, the Georgia Supreme Court has made efforts to curb the ad-
mission of unconstitutional statements. In Livingston v. State,"z the
court recognized that "under certain circumstances victim impact evi-
dence could render a defendant's trial fundamentally unfair and could
lead to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty."83 The Living-
ston court cautioned that prejudice, particularly racial prejudice or
prejudice towards religious preference, is an arbitrary factor that
would render a capital sentencing trial fundamentally unfair. 4 The
court also held "that it would be constitutionally impermissible for a
jury to base its death penalty recommendation on the victim's class or
wealth.""5
To prevent these potentialities, the Livingston court ordered that
trial courts must have evidentiary hearings and rule prior to trial on
the admissibility of the victim impact evidence sought to be offered.8 6
79. Id. § 17-10-1.2(a)(1).
80. The Georgia code gives the trial court discretion to exclude victim impact evidence
altogether. GA. CODE A, N. § 17-10-1.2(a)(1) (victim impact evidence "shall be permitted
only in such a manner and to such a degree as not to inflame or unduly prejudice the
jury").
81. See generally Katharyne C. Johnson, Sentencing and Punishment: Permit Judicial
Consideration of Certain Evidence and Testimony in Cases in which the Death Penalty May
be Imposed, 10 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 113 (1993).
82. 444 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. 1994).
83. Id. at 751.
84. See id. (citing Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d 266, 275 (Ga. 1983)).
85. Id. (citing Ingram v. State, 323 S.E.2d 801, 813-14 (Ga. 1984)).
86. Livingston, 444 S.E.2d. at 752. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the guilt-inno-
cence phase of the trial, the trial court may reconsider any pre-trial decision regarding the
admissibility of victim impact evidence. See id.
This requires the State to notify the defendant of victim impact evi-
dence which it intends to offer, and the trial court to notify the de-
fendant of the questions it intends to ask of the State's prospective
witnesses.
In Turner v. State,8" the Supreme Court of Georgia added yet an-
other procedural safeguard for the admission of victim impact evi-
dence. It held that "in future cases in which victim impact evidence is
given in the sentencing phase of a death penalty or life without parole
case, the trial court should instruct the jury regarding the purpose of
victim impact evidence."8 9 The court gave a sample jury instruction
which implores the jury to consider victim impact evidence only as an
indication of the victim's uniqueness, and not as a substitute for rea-
sonable doubt or an aggravating factor justifying death.9° Providing
such instruction to the jury, the court held, is essential to protecting
against constitutionally impermissible bias in sentencing.91 Thus,
Georgia's victim impact statute, though very broad on its face, has
been narrowly tailored by case law to impose procedural requirements
on the admission of victim impact evidence.
Fourteen states have a general statute providing for a sentencing
court to hear all evidence relevant to the crime or sentence.92 Mary-
land's statute, for example, states that the court may admit "[a]ny
87. See id.
88. Turner v. State, 486 S.E.2d 839 (1997).
89. Turner, 486 S.E.2d at 842. Other states require that the jury be instructed on the
purpose of victim impact evidence. See State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23,678 A.2d 164, 178
(N.J. 1996); Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828-29 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 831, 117 S. Ct. 100, 136 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1996); Evans v. State, 637 A.2d 117, 131 (Md.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct. 109, 130 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1994).
90. Turner, 486 S.E.2d at 842-43. For example, the trial court might charge: The prose-
cution introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is not
the same as evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim im-
pact evidence does not relieve the state of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. This evidence is simply another
method of informing you about the harm caused by the crime in question. To the extent
that you find that this evidence reflects on the defendant's culpability you may consider it,
but you may not use it as a substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence
of a statutory aggravating circumstance. See id.
91. See id.
92. Those 14 statutes are: ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (Michie 1994); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(c) (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413
(1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (1995);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.552(3) (Michie Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1
and 20A-5 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
204 (Lexis Supp. 1997); TEX. CODE ClM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1997); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.4 and 264.5 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060
(West 1990); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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other evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to
sentencing, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any statements."'93 California's statute states that "[i]n deter-
mining the penalty, the trier of fact shall consider the following fac-
tor[] if relevant: (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the
defendant was convicted in the present proceeding.... ."I Tennessee
permits evidence that includes, "but [is] not... limited to, the nature
and circumstances of the crime.. . ."I' General statutes such as these
permit the jury to hear virtually any type victim impact testimony that
pertains to the death of the victim, and such ambiguity can lead to
serious constitutional problems when attempting to impose fair
sentencing.
IV. What Are the Parameters of Victim Impact Testimony
After Payne? A Look at Timothy
Mcveigh's Sentencing
Before the penalty phase of Timothy McVeigh's trial began, Mc-
Veigh filed an extensive motion in limine. He asserted that the admis-
sion of victim impact testimony in his case would inevitably lead to a
violation of the Eighth Amendment and his right to a fair trial.96 Al-
ternatively, McVeigh requested that the court limit the admission of
victim impact evidence, and employ specific procedural safeguards to
ensure that the testimony did not render his trial fundamentally un-
fair.97 The court granted some of McVeigh's requests to exclude cer-
tain victim impact evidence, but in general interpreted Payne to allow
for the broad admission of most of the victim impact evidence
offered.98
The trial judge acknowledged that under Payne "there simply is
no clear guidance as to where the line between appropriate... victim
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 413(c)(v) (1996). See generally Ilana Subar, Emphasiz-
ing Victims' Rights at the Sentencing Phase of Criminal Proceedings, 55 MD. L. REv. 722
(1996).
94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3; See also People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1991)
(concluding that victim impact evidence or "evidence of the specific harm caused by the
defendant" is a circumstance of the crime admissible under § 190.3(a)).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(c).
96. See Defendant McVeigh's Motion for New Trial, Request for Evidentiary Hearing,
and memorandum in support, 1997 WL 403417, at 83, United States v. McVeigh, 940 F.
Supp. 1541 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68M) [hereinafter Motion]. The motion included a
discussion of victim impact testimony and exhibits (photographs, etc.). However, victim
impact exhibits are beyond the scope of this comment.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 92.
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impact evidence ends and an appeal to passion, the human reactions,
emotive reactions of revenge, rage, empathy-all of those things-be-
gins."9 9 The court wrestled with the amorphous nature of Payne, and
outlined what it considered to be the parameters of admissible victim
impact testimony:
I think it's got to be as objective as possible and it has got to be
the consequences of the crime. And I don't believe that it can
have as much emotional impact as some of the things that are
being discussed here .... It can include the loss of a-people to
an agency and can include the loss of a family member, what has
happened, the empty chair, but not the emotional aspect of that,
the grieving process, the mourning process. I don't think that's
part of it. That's where I'm talking about objective, as opposed
to subjective. The facts rather than the emotional impact.100
One may speculate as to whether the Justices in Payne envisioned
that the federal standard for admissibility of victim impact statements
in capital sentencing would be so amorphously defined by a court.
What is clear, however, is how easily the line blurs between objective
factual testimony and emotional response.
McVeigh recognized that victim impact testimony at capital sen-
tencing was "a difficult area because of the lack of guidance and the
lack of precision of guidelines."'' McVeigh raised several concerns
about several categories of victim impact evidence that the prosecutor
sought to admit at sentencing. First, he was concerned "that some of
the testimony appears to be the equivalent of eulogies."'0° McVeigh
argued that this type of over idealizing implies a comparison of the
victims' worth with the defendant's.1 3 He was concerned that the tes-
timony would resemble "statements that one might make at a funeral,
designed to invoke empathetic identification with the person who has
been lost" rather than the fact-based circumstantial evidence that the
Payne Court thought proper. 0 4
Second, McVeigh objected to graphic testimony about the nature
of the injuries sustained by the victims. McVeigh asserted that it was
99. See id. at 91.
100. See id.
101. Hearings on motions (victims rights clarification, motion for voir dire of jury, mo-
tion for recess, motion in limine, motion for voir dire of witness), 1997 WL 290019, at 11,
United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CR-68) [hereinafter
Hearings].
102. 1&
103. See id
104. Id. at 12.
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"the verbal equivalent of gruesome photographs . . . [which would
likely] evoke highly emotional and visceral responses."'10 5
Third, McVeigh was concerned with what he called "highly
charged emotional statements."' 6 Specifically, he argued that de-
tailed descriptions of a person's mourning, such as that gleaned from a
letter or poem, goes "beyond the necessary description to depict the
victim as an individual. ' 1°7
Fourth, McVeigh raised several concerns over specific witnesses
who were to give testimony during his sentencing. McVeigh objected
to testimony describing two law enforcement officers who died. 08 He
argued that testimony about the careers of the law enforcement of-
ficers, including history and length of employment, crosses the line. It
gives the jury too much information about the life of the deceased
person, thereby shifting the jury's focus from defendant to victim.10 9
McVeigh also objected to testimony by the chief medical examiner
involving graphic, and overly gruesome depictions of the crime
scene.
110
McVeigh contested specific testimony from several rescue work-
ers about the impact of their rescue efforts on them. While acknowl-
edging that the pain and emotional distress suffered by rescue workers
bears some relation to the trial, McVeigh drew a distinction between
them and the people who were directly affected by the explosion.
"The larger question [raised] is if people who are indirectly affected,
even grievously, by an incident, can be allowed to give victim impact
testimony about their own condition, where does the line get
drawn?""' McVeigh analogized the rescue worker testimony to that
of the entire city. He pointed out that the city and its inhabitants had
surely been affected by the explosion and the impact they felt was
different only in degree from the rescue workers, not in kind.
Finally, McVeigh contested the testimony of a witness who came
to the Victims Assistance Center daily to provide briefings for family
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Hearings, 1997 WL 290019, at 12.
108. See id. at 14.
109. See id. The court responded to this contention by stating that one of the appropri-
ate things to be considered was the impact the loss of the life of the person had on the
community. In other words, "what this person would be doing today if he or she were still
alive" is entirely appropriate testimony, which includes employment history and accom-
plishments. Id.
110. See id. at 15.
111. Id. at 16.
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members awaiting news.112 The witness wanted to testify about the
responses to the information he was providing. McVeigh argued that
"the detail in which family members' reactions are recounted and the
emotionality that is inherent in those accounts ... risks tipping the
balance between emotion and reason." 1
13
The Government's argument in opposition to McVeigh's motion
was that its objective was limited to helping "the jury make [a] rea-
soned moral judgment as the conscience of the community as to the
appropriate punishment.""14 The government asserted that the victim
impact testimony would aid the jury by offering "objective factual tes-
timony about the circumstances of the offense and the effects they felt
from the offense.""' The Government interpreted Payne to allow the
State "the moral force of the evidence," meaning that it need not pres-
ent evidence in the least prejudicial manner, as McVeigh had ar-
gued." 6 Nevertheless, the Government stated it did not intend to
inflame the jury, but rather, it sought to assist the jury in making a
reasoned moral judgment.
The Government maintained that it did not intend to offer any
testimony in the nature of eulogies, as McVeigh had contended. In-
stead, the testimony was designed to portray "an objective story re-
garding a brief snapshot and understanding of the identity of the
victim.""' 7 Such testimony could include the type of activities the vic-
tim was involved in, the way the witness interacted with the victim,
and the effect the person had on the community." 8 The Government
assured the court that this testimony would be brief, not to exceed 15
minutes:
It will certainly be far less extensive about the background of
any one individual or even all the individuals that we offer com-
bined than the defendant will present about himself. The jury
will certainly know more about the defendant individually at the
end of the process than it knows about any one of these victims
or even, I would say, the victims who testify all together. There
will be far less known about all of them together than there is
known about the defendant." 9
112. See id. at 17.
113. Hearings, 1997 WL 290019, at 17.
114. Id. at 19.
115. Id. at 20.
116. Id. at 19.
117. Id. at 20.
118. See id.
119. Hearings, 1997 WL 290019, at 20.
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The Government's intent not to belabor the proceedings with vic-
tim impact testimony is evidenced by the fact that it culled 40 to 45
persons from a list of 168 victims to provide such testimony.
120
The Government successfully rebutted McVeigh's challenge that
the testimony of the medical examiner would be overly graphic. The
Government assured that he would only be testifying about a repre-
sentative sampling of the causes of death. For example, he would tes-
tify as to whether the victim died instantaneously or whether life
continued after the explosion.
12
The Government argued unsuccessfully to admit testimony by
victims about identifying their loved ones at the scene.' 22 The prof-
fered evidence would have included testimony from witnesses who
"came in after the bombing when their loved one was identified," and
descriptions of "the condition of the body and the arrangements that
had to be made in terms of identifying the person and then in terms of
putting the person to rest."'" Contending that such testimony goes to
the effect of the offense, the Government argued that the explosion
caused not only the death of the victim but also forced the surviving
family members to identify the deceased. The court excluded this
evidence.
The Government indicated that it would offer testimony from
two rescuers who were with two victims when they died. 124 The testi-
mony would describe the emotional impact the rescue workers felt
because of what they observed, including recurring nightmares."z The
court admitted this testimony, reasoning that the rescue workers' re-
action to the event was so foreseeable that they could be considered
victims for victim impact testimonial purposes. 26
The court also admitted the challenged testimony of the witness
who came daily to the Victims Assistance Center and briefed family
members on recovery efforts. The court approved of the Govern-
ment's contention that the testimony would be a factual account of
120. Id Of this number, only 25 to 30 witnesses were related to or testified on behalf of
one particular deceased victim. Id.
121. See id. at 22.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 23.
124. See id.
125. See Hearings, 1997 WL 290019, at 23.
126. The judge stated: "Obviously a bombing of this type is going to require direct and
immediate response .... [W]ithout permitting the matter to get cumulative, it seems to me
that some aspects of the experience of those who were called to the scene qualifies them as
victims within the concept here of victim impact testimony." Id. at 16.
who asked and said what, rather than a characterization of
emotions. 127
The final testimonial issue challenged by McVeigh was that of a
minor who lost his mother. The Government explained that it "did
not seek to introduce testimony from any children," but that this was a
special circumstance."2 The father of the minor indicated that it was
very important for his son to testify as to the loss of his mother. The
court allowed the child's testimony. 29 In contrast, a poem written by
the father of one of the victims was excluded.' 30
Finally, McVeigh asked the court to consider state court decisions
to define appropriate procedural parameters to the introduction of
victim impact evidence.' 3' McVeigh cited three state court decisions
in which a preliminary voir dire with respect to victim impact wit-
nesses was required, so that there would be less risk of unexpected
emotion overtaking witnesses.' 32 The court declined to hold such a
hearing. 33 However, other procedural safeguards had been granted
to McVeigh, including, most significantly, a running objection to all
the victim impact testimony.13 4
The extensive attention given to victim impact evidence before
McVeigh's sentencing phase demonstrates the ambiguity of guidelines
governing its admission after Payne. The court admitted that the lack
of clear guidance in federal courts would undoubtedly result in rulings
which "are not going to be consistent with the views of many. '35 For
example, testimony of rescue workers regarding their rescue mission
and its aftermath was admitted, while testimony of family members
who found or identified bodies of their loved ones was excluded. Sim-
ilarly, testimony of a witness who briefed victims daffy at a Victims
Assistance Center was admitted, while a poem written by the father of
127. See id. at 24.
128. See id. at 24.
129. See id. at 25.
130. See id. at 23.
131. See Motion, 1997 WL 403417, at 91.
132. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 67-9. The three state court deci-
sions McVeigh cited were State v. Mohammed, 678 A.2d 164, 180 (N.J. 1996), State v. Ber-
nard, 608 So. 2d 966, 968 (La. 1992), and Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1999).
133. The court stated: "With all due respect to that court, that's an appellate view of
things, and it's not a trial judge's view of things. We can't do dress rehearsals, so I'm not
going to do that." Hearings, 1997 WL 290019, at 33.
134. See Motion, 1997 WL 403417, at 93. A running objection spared McVeigh the
inconvenience, and potential for prejudice, of mounting an individual objection to each
witness in front of the jury.
135. See id. at 92.
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a deceased victim was excluded. These examples do more than
demonstrate the blurred line between what is and is not admissible;
they raise questions as to how directly a witness needs to be affected
in order to provide victim impact testimony.
The need for objective testimony must be balanced with fairness
in who gets to testify. In addition, under Payne, admitting testimony
about employment history and accomplishments sets the stage for val-
uation of the victim's worth. Perhaps the greatest ambiguity associ-
ated with Payne, and epitomized in McVeigh's sentencing, concerns
the sheer volume of witnesses. Payne addressed victim impact testi-
mony for one victim; whereas in McVeigh's case, liberal admission of
victim impact testimony relating to multiple victims must have had an
exponential impact at sentencing. McVeigh's sentencing illustrates
many problems associated with Payne that must be addressed.
V. Criticism of Victim Impact Statements
In order to determine the appropriate parameters for victim im-
pact statements in capital sentencing, an understanding of its major
criticisms is necessary. Leading critics of victim impact testimony
have cited many of the same arguments raised by McVeigh during his
trial.
A leading criticism of victim impact statements is that they vio-
late the defendant's right to equal protection by leading to disparate
treatment of similarly situated defendants.136 Victim impact state-
ments shift the sentencing jury's focus from the defendant to the vic-
tim, leading ultimately to arbitrary sentencing based on perceptions of
the victim's family, or, perhaps more commonly, whether the victim
left behind a family at all. "As long as victim impact plays a role in
capital sentencing, comparison of the victim to the defendant by jurors
is inevitable. Jurors will use their personal views and experiences to
make such comparisons."' 37 For example, in Livingston v. State, Chief
Justice Benham stated in his dissent that the broad scope of victim
impact evidence "creates a grave risk that the jury may conclude that
it is permissible for its decision to impose the death penalty to be
based on such constitutionally impermissible factors as race, religion,
136. This aspect of victim impact evidence was raised in Booth. 482 U.S. at 506 n.8. See
also Cecil A. Rhodes, The Victim Impact Statement and Capital Crimes: Trial by Jury and
Death by Character, 21 S.U. L. REv. 1, 27 (1994) ("Equally troublesome for the [Booth]
Court was the disparate and unequal treatment the victim impact statement would present
during sentencing in capital cases."). Justice Stevens also addressed this issue in his dis-
senting opinion in Payne. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 856.
137. Anderson, supra note 13, at 420.
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class, or wealth."' 38 Such evidence encourages distinctions about the
personal worth and social status of victims, which conflicts with the
notion that every person's life is equally precious. 139
Victim impact statements may also bias the jury in favor of those
who grieve most, or best.140 When the sentencing jury hears victim
impact testimony from a family member, "the eloquence of that
speaker may play a role in the jury's decision. In fact, some states
even allow victim's family members to hire an attorney to present
their statements for them. Consequently, a wealthy family would be
able to secure an articulate speaker, while a poor family may not be
able to afford one at all.' 4' Thus, arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty could be easily exacerbated based on the victim's
perceived status in society.
Additionally, critics assert that the introduction of victim impact
evidence will perpetuate racial discrepancies in the capital sentencing
process.4 1 The Baldus studies already demonstrate that juries value
white victims more than they do black victims. 43 "If the statistics in-
dicating racial disparity reflect subconscious racism in the sentencing
process, there is no reason to expect that such factors will not con-
tinue.""' Thus, victim impact evidence only further exacerbates the
risk of bias in a capital sentencing scheme that is already haunted by
racial discrimination. Justice Stevens raised this same concern in his
dissenting opinion in Payne. Stevens likened victim impact evidence
intended to identify some victims as more worthy of protection than
others to "decisions based on the same invidious motives as a prosecu-
tor's decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is white but to ac-
cept a plea bargain if the victim is black."' 45
Critics also assert that victim impact statements evoke emotions
inappropriate in the context of capital sentencing. "[V]ictim impact
statements appeal to hatred, the desire for undifferentiated yen-
138. Livingston v. State, 444 S.E.2d 748,760 (Ga. 1994) (Benham, P.J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted). See supra text accompanying note 85.
139. See icL
140. See id.
141. Hauptman, supra note 57, at 476.
142. Vital, supra note 36, at 515 ("Practically, Payne has the potential of fueling racism
in the capital sentencing process."). See also Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering: A Per-
sonal Reflection and a Victim-Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 21 (1992).
143. McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 353-56, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).
144. Anderson, supra note 13, at 419.
145. Payne, 501 U.S. at 866.
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geance, and even bigotry."' 46 This inhibits the jury's ability to con-
sider dispassionately the defendant's story. 4 7 The decision to impose
the death penalty must be based on reason, not emotion or the emo-
tional impact on a victim's family.
Some argue that capital sentencing is not the appropriate arena
for victims to tell their story because "[e]motionaUy charged tales of
woe or financial ruin carry a high risk of bias."' 48 They potentially
"strike chords of sympathy" that ignite "smoldering feelings of out-
rage and frustration" in the jury, thus making it more likely that the
jury will inflict an "unduly harsh penalty."' 49 The jury's resort to emo-
tion makes for arbitrary judgements in capital cases at best.150 More-
over, since victim impact statements are a purely emotional
presentation, it would be difficult to counteract its effect through testi-
mony or other judicial restraints.' 51 Strategically, tactically, and from
a practical standpoint, a defendant who casts stones on his victim's
character cannot possibly ingratiate a jury. 5 1
Another argument against victim impact statements is that such
evidence does not further the goals of criminal punishment. 53 To be-
gin with, critics argue victim impact statements do not further the goal
of incapacitation. 54 The purpose of incapacitation is to separate
those individuals who cannot live by society's rules from those who
can.155 In other words, remove the offenders so that they cannot con-
tinue to wreak havoc on society. 156 In determining the length of inca-
pacitation, the sentencing jury must consider the nature of the crime,
and the likelihood of future dangerousness. Victim impact statements
are wholly unrelated to the issue of future dangerousness, and the na-
146. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L.
REv. 361, 365 (1996).
147. See id.
148. See Long, supra note 8, at 222.
149. Id. at 223.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Rhodes, supra note 136, at 27 ("putting a convicted murderer in a position of try-
ing to rebut the testimony of positive character of the murdered victim is at best extremely
risky, and almost damning to the defense"). See also Thomas J. Phalen & Jane L. McClel-
Ian, Speaking for the Dead at Sentencing, 31-NOV ARiz. Arr'y 12,33, Nov. 1994, available
in WESTLAW AZAT' database ("Almost by definition, victim impact statements in a
capital case will be highly inflammatory, emotional, prejudicial, and impossible to rebut.").
153. Dugger, supra note 4, at 403 ("Victim impact evidence is simply not consistent with
the traditional goals of sentencing. It furthers none of the historically considered ambi-
tions of punishment.").
154. See id. at 401.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 401-03.
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ture of the crime has already been gleaned from, and established in,
the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Furthermore, in a capital sen-
tencing hearing, incapacitation is already guaranteed: the issue now
being whether the defendant will be incapacitated for life, behind
bars, or incapacitated by death. With or without victim impact state-
ments, the goal of incapacitation will be met after capital
sentencing.15 7
Secondly, victim impact statements do not achieve the sentencing
goal of deterrence. 8 Under the deterrence principle, society discour-
ages participation in criminal activity through punishment. The the-
ory is that a potential offender will not commit a crime if the offender
knows the consequences of the crime are grave.'5 9 However, with the
proliferation of victim impact statements, criminals may believe they
will be treated differently based on the identity of their victim. Since a
criminal is generally unaware of the victim's characteristics at the time
of the crime, this will hardly deter that criminal. Deterrence cannot
be effective when those who society seeks to deter do not know what
factors will be considered at sentencing. 6 °
Nonetheless, an argument can be made that victim impact testi-
mony accomplishes some retributive goals. Retribution involves the
State "standing in" for the victim and seeking "payment" to society in
general for what damage the defendant has done.' 6' If retribution in-
volves mending the social tear or somehow restoring balance to soci-
ety, then surely there is a need to calculate the loss suffered by victims
of the crime. There is no person who can better calculate the cost of a
crime than one who has been directly affected by it. However, when
retribution means seeking payment to society for what harm the de-
fendant has caused, the line begins to blur between the theory of retri-
bution and the theory of vengeance. 62 "[I]t seems that retribution
allows the thoughts of the victim's loved ones to become a form of
compensation, for no other productive reason than to allow the ex-
pression of their anger."163 If retribution, and not vengeance, is to be
achieved as a goal of capital sentencing, it will be achieved more suc-
157. See id. at 402.
158. See id at 401.
159. See Dugger, supra note 4, at 400. Under the "specific" deterrence principle, one
who committed a crime may be deterred from further criminal actions based solely on his
own experiences with punishment. Id
160. See id.
161. See Charles E. Torcia, 1 Wharton's Criminal Law 2, at 8 (14 th ed. 1978).
162. See Bandes, supra note 146, at 398 ("the idea of venting collective outrage diverges
sharply from traditional retributive theory").
163. See Dugger, supra note 4, at 399.
SPRING 19991 VICTM IMPACT STATEMENTS
736 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:711
cessfully by appropriate sentencing, and less so by victim participation
in sentencing.
Finally, victim impact statements do not further the goal of reha-
bilitation.1" Rehabilitation turns on the likelihood society can reform
the defendant, with the underlying intent to rehabilitate the offender
with society.'65 Victim impact statements do not enlighten this deter-
mination. In fact, critics contend that victim impact statements under-
mine this sentencing goal by obviating the jury's ability to view the
defendant compassionately, emphatically, and with mercy.'6 6 "Victim
impact statements appeal to hatred, the desire for undifferentiated
vengeance, and even bigotry. In doing so, they block the sentencer's
ability to perceive the essential humanity of the defendant."'67 Victim
impact statements impinge upon the jury's ability to entertain compas-
sion for the defendant. By undermining the perception that the de-
fendant may be capable of reform, victim impact statements run the
risk of subverting this sentencing goal.
VI. Defining the Parameters of Appropriate Victim Impact
Testimony in Capital Sentencing
If admission of victim impact statements is narrowly tailored, it
will accomplish its important objective of equating punishment with
harm. The impact of a crime should be a factor at sentencing, but its
introduction at capital sentencing must be carefully scrutinized so as
not to inflame or unduly prejudice the jury. The ungoverned admis-
sion of victim impact statements articulated in Payne, and exemplified
in Timothy McVeigh's trial as well as in various state cases, has no
place in capital jurisprudence. Payne allows for the introduction of
evidence without imposing a procedure, and as such Payne alone can-
not possibly guide federal or state law.168
While it is difficult to determine the appropriate parameters of
victim impact testimony, consideration of how some of the states are
responding to Payne certainly provides some guidance. For example,
Georgia's admission of evidence by any individual with "personal
164. See id. at 402. ("Victim impact evidence is simply not consistent with the tradi-
tional goals of sentencing. It furthers none of the historically considered ambitions of
punishment").
165. See id.
166. Bandes, supra note 146, at 401-05.
167. See id.
168. Anderson, supra note 13, at 403 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Payne has
opened the door to victim participation in capital jury sentencing and has not placed many
tangible limits on that participation.").
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knowledge" extends the definition of who can testify too far.1 69 This
same broad standard was applied in Timothy McVeigh's sentencing.
170
On a practical level, this standard opens the door to volumes of testi-
mony by multiple witnesses. Additionally, allowing any person with
"personal knowledge" to give victim impact evidence enables the po-
tential for bias to run with the status of the person who testifies. In
other words, some witnesses will command more respect in the court-
room than others. However, since "[tihe feeling of identification with
the victim of a crime often comes naturally,"'' it is likely that if testi-
mony were limited to family members (or at least those directly ef-
fected by the crime), every witness would command equal respect. Of
course, even here certain families will invariably have more articulate
representatives than others. However, it is difficult to imagine a sce-
nario where an otherwise impartial juror would not seriously consider
testimony of a family's loss, regardless of that witness's ability to artic-
ulate such loss. By restricting testimony to family members, or at least
those directly related by the crime, the risk of arbitrariness based on
who best articulates their loss is diminished.
Another practice that seems unnecessarily broad is Georgia's ad-
mission of evidence relating to "impact on the community.' 1 72 To be-
gin with, some communities will be better situated to articulate their
loss by the victim's death.'73 For example, members of a well-edu-
cated and organized professional community would be in a better po-
sition to articulate their loss than members of an unemployed,
impoverished, migrant community. Additionally, testimony as to im-
pact on the community potentially opens the door to shades of socio-
economic discrimination. It increases the possibility of correlating the
victim's standing in the community with the defendant's punishment,
thus escalating the risk of arbitrary sentencing. For example, the loss
of a town physician or a chairman of the board would likely generate
more witnesses who could speak to impact on the community than an
individual in a less prominent professional or social position.
However, the potential for any resulting socio-economic bias
could be diminished by restricting testimony to impact on one unit:
the family. In fact, it is possible that the potential for socio-economic
discrimination could be alleviated significantly, as sympathy for a fi-
169. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
170. See supra note 126.
171. Bandes, supra note 146, at 400.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
173. Long, supra note 8, at 224 ("Undoubtedly, certain communities will be better
poised to take advantage of community-input opportunities.").
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nancially impoverished family who has lost its sole provider may run
even more rampant than sympathy for a financially secure family who
has lost one of many sources of income.
By narrowing who can testify, and on what, the sheer number of
witnesses will inevitably be reduced. Nothing illustrates the need to
reduce volume as clearly as Timothy McVeigh's sentencing. In addi-
tion to being cumulative, each additional witness who testifies to the
same loss is likely to move the jury one step further from reason and
one step closer to passion.
If there is one aspect of Payne that is not ambiguous, it is that
victim impact witnesses should not be allowed to express their opinion
as to the punishment of the defendant. 74 Arguably, this could include
prayers in the courtroom, either to God, or simply for justice to be
done. In this respect, Missouri's statutory allowance of all "evidence
concerning the murder victim" crosses the line in terms of appropriate
victim impact testimony. 75 Certainly, victims are entitled to confer
with prosecutors in terms of whether they wish the death penalty to be
sought. However, these discussions should be held behind closed
doors, and not in a court of law in front of a jury. This kind of testi-
mony could inflame the jury, making any reasoned decision
unrealistic.
Opinion as to the punishment a defendant should receive is dif-
ferent from a characterization of the crime, although admittedly the
line can easily blur. With regard to characterizations of the crime,
there is no reason why victims who were directly involved with the
crime-who were witnesses, or who found the evidence-should not
have the opportunity to testify to the nature of the crime. The crimi-
nal who perpetrates a crime with knowledge that witnesses are in-
volved can reasonably foresee the harm caused by such an act, and
must be confronted by its impact.
New Jersey's procedural requirement of having the defendant
open the door to his character before victim impact statements shall
be heard also seems to be an appropriate parameter narrowing the
introduction of victim impact testimony. While the practical result
may be a reluctance on the defendant's part to introduce any mitiga-
tion, allowing victim impact statements in response to character evi-
dence at least gives the State an alternative to its traditional role of
silence during mitigation. Moreover, since neither mitigation nor vic-
174. See supra note 43, and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 75, and accompanying text.
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tim impact evidence is directly refutable, each side will introduce evi-
dence that stands on its own as opposed to rebuttal evidence.
If a jury is to hear this type of evidence, the clearest and most
consistent instruction is necessary. New Jersey provides a good model
for proffering adequate jury instructions to help the jury weigh the
evidence it hears at sentencing. The New Jersey Supreme Court man-
dated that all capital sentencing jury instructions explain that victim
impact evidence is to be used only to determine how much weight to
ascribe to a catch-all mitigating factor, and not as supporting the ag-
gravating factors or as a general justification for the death penalty.176
Consider also an instruction promulgated by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Oklahoma, to be used in all future capital murder cases in
which victim impact evidence is presented:
177
The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact
evidence. This evidence has been introduced to show the finan-
cial, emotional, psychological, or physical effects of the victim's
death on the members of the victim's immediate family. It is
intended to remind you as the sentencer that just as the defend-
ant should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death may represent a unique loss to society
and the family. This evidence is simply another method of in-
forming you about the specific harm caused by the crime in
question. You may consider the evidence in determining an ap-
propriate punishment. However, your consideration must be
limited to a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant,
not an emotional response to the evidence.
Jury instructions such as this would provide a necessary safeguard
against impermissible consideration of victim impact evidence.
Other pre-trial procedures that states have adopted seem to be
appropriate safeguards. Both Georgia and New Jersey require the
trial court to hear and rule on the admissibility of victim impact evi-
dence sought to be offered before trial. This guards against any sur-
prise testimony, and prevents highly prejudicial evidence from coming
to a jury's attention at all. Of course, if all else fails, the defendant
will always be able to raise a claim under the Due Process Clause.
VII. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the victim's voice creates fairness in a capi-
tal sentence proceeding. Although this is a voice that can never be
176. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
177. Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
178. Id.
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rebutted, there is no requirement of parity in the treatment of victim
and defendant. However, there is a requirement that the defendant's
rights not be grossly disproportionate to the State's right. While the
defendant already has extra safeguards to counteract the awesome
power of the State, the defendant is still entitled to have some param-
eters placed on the victim's voice.
Thanks in part to poorly articulated parameters in Payne, victim
impact testimony in capital sentencing walks a fine line between al-
lowing particularized attention to the damage caused by the crime on
the one hand, and leaving the jury to be inundated with prejudicial
outpourings irrelevant to the defendant's guilt on the other. If the
courts can control the influence of victim impact testimony by placing
restrictions on its admission, then the "account of the suffering of the
victim's survivors in individual cases [would serve as] a particulariza-
tion of a generally foreseeable harm."'7 There is a strong argument
that such an articulation will accomplish the backward-looking goal of
retribution. By its very goal of "seeking payment," retribution allows
for a form of retaliation by those affected by the crime. 8 ' Since the
only available role at trial for those affected by the crime is recounting
the harm that has been experienced, victim impact testimony does
have a retributive quality. As such, there is a clear role for such evi-
dence in capital sentencing.
Capital punishment jurisprudence is already unavoidably emo-
tional. Nevertheless, this does not mean there is a place for unbridled,
emotional testimony in capital sentencing. There is a place for testi-
mony about the impact of the crime, and the harm perpetrated by the
defendant. After all, the sentencing phase is no longer about the
crime; it is about the defendant. The defendant does not perpetrate
his crime in a vacuum. He alters the balance of many lives. This harm
is reasonably foreseeable, and the defendant must be made to account
for it. By narrowly defining the parameters of Payne, this accountabil-
ity will fall within the limits of other constitutional guarantees.
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